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Preface
In this brief, Scott Fullwiler and Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray
review the roles of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury in the
context of quantitative easing (QE). They find that the crisis has
highlighted the limited oversight of Congress and the limited
transparency of the Fed. And since a Fed promise is ultimately a
Treasury promise that carries the full faith and credit of the US
government, the question is whether the Fed should be able to
commit the public purse in times of national crisis.   
According to the authors, the Fed has not learned how to
efficiently  implement  monetary  policy.  QE  can  only  work
through price effects, not through quantity, and it is probable
that a second round—QE2—could be deflationary. Since fiscal
policy is the only possible engine of growth to lead an economic
recovery,  policymakers  must  rely  on  domestic  measures  to
reverse job loss. Otherwise, there is a real danger that the United
States will slip back into recession. 
When the global financial crisis began in 2007, the Fed pro-
vided liquidity and created extraordinary standing facilities,
which provided short-term credit in the money markets. The
Treasury  also  intervened  to  extend  funds  and  guarantees.
Though the total amount of government commitments is esti-
mated at more than $20 trillion, only a very small portion was
explicitly approved by Congress. 
The Fed’s focus on fighting inflation seems to have diverted
attention away from its core responsibilities. The crisis demon-
strates the wisdom of returning the Fed to its original mission: to
pursue a dual mandate of full employment and reasonable price
stability, provide an elastic supply of currency and act as lender
of last resort to banks, and regulate financial institutions.
The belief that QE encourages banks to lend excess reserves
is clearly mistaken. Another fallacy is that banks need excess
reserves in order to induce loans to firms and households.
Moreover, the stimulative effects of QE are insignificant, since
there is no guarantee that market forces will reduce yields based
on a particular quantity of Treasuries purchased by the Fed.
The authors disagree with Fed critics who are concerned
that QE will lead to inflation and dollar depreciation, and they do
not support the strategy to pressure US trading partners to
appreciate their currencies. Rather, the Fed and the Treasury
should announce their intention not to depreciate the dollar, and
US policymakers should focus on domestic policy measures to
end the crisis. In addition, the belief that monetary policy alone
can  stabilize  the  US  economy  is  erroneous  and  dangerous.
Monetary policy played a major role in pumping up asset prices,
which subsequently collapsed in a speculative bust. Meanwhile,
the neglect of fiscal policy generated macroeconomic imbal-
ances—for example, a record level of household indebtedness as
borrowing substituted for jobs and income growth. 
QE1 mitigated the economic downturn in spite of some ill-
conceived spending and tax cuts, say the authors. The major
problem was that the stimulus package was too small, and only
temporary. They support a larger and more permanent fiscal pol-
icy to deal with the recession. The first task of fiscal policy at this
time is to reverse job loss. Although their position is at odds with
current attempts to reduce the US budget deficit, they note that
the deficit is mostly due to collapsing tax revenues, combined
with automatic stabilizers such as unemployment compensation.
The deficit will decline rapidly when the economy recovers, they
say. Thus, reactive policies such as spending cuts and higher taxes
during normal deficit expansions would be a mistake. 
Another reason to reject undue reliance on monetary policy
is the lack of democratic accountability. While the Fed is account-
able to Congress, current law does not provide Congress with sub-
stantive control of the Fed. There is an inherent conflict between
the need for oversight and transparency associated with public
spending, and the need for independence and secrecy in formu-
lating monetary policy. The bailouts have been uncoordinated and
largely executed in secret—by the Fed. And the massive, mostly
off-budget support of Wall Street has proven to be a tremendous
barrier to formulating another stimulus package for Main Street.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
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Mission and Dual Mandate of the Fed
The Federal Reserve System was founded by act of Congress in
1913, with the primary directive to “furnish an elastic currency.”
Its  mission  was  expanded  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Great
Depression to include responsibility for operating monetary pol-
icy in a manner to help stabilize the economy. After World War
II, Congress directed the Fed to pursue a dual mandate, long
interpreted to mean full employment and reasonable price sta-
bility. The Fed was left to decide how to implement policy to
achieve these objectives, and has over time experimented with a
variety of methods, including interest rate, reserve, and money
aggregate targets. While some central banks have adopted explicit
inflation targets, the Fed has argued that this would limit its abil-
ity to respond in a flexible manner to disruptions, and would not
be consistent with its dual mandate. Note also that none of the
later amendments to the 1913 act have supplanted the Fed’s orig-
inal directive to act as lender of last resort or manager of the
national payments system, and thus provide an “elastic currency.”
Finally, the Fed has always been in charge of regulating and super-
vising member banks—a responsibility it shares with the Treasury. 
When the global financial crisis began in 2007, the Fed
reacted by providing liquidity through its discount window and
open market operations, later supplemented by a number of
extraordinary facilities designed to provide reserves as well as
guarantees.  The  creation  of  various  standing  facilities  that
extended short-term credit to banks, primary dealers, and other
money market players was labeled “credit easing” by Chairman
Bernanke and others. (Most of the credit extended through these
facilities was wound down by late 2009.)
The Treasury also intervened to provide funds and guaran-
tees to the financial (and nonfinancial) sector, in some cases
working with the Fed. Some estimates place the total amount in
government loans, purchases, and guarantees made during the
crisis at more than $20 trillion—an amount far greater than the
value of the nation’s total annual production. Only a very small
portion of this funding was explicitly approved by Congress, and
much of the detail surrounding commitments made—especially
those made by the Fed—is still unknown. 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper, it has become
clear that inadequate regulation and supervision of financial
institutions by the Fed played an important role in the transfor-
mation of the financial sector that made this crisis possible. A
dangerous philosophy developed over the past several decades
that deregulation and self-supervision would increase market
efficiency and allocate risk to those best able to bear it. Time after
time, the Fed refused to intervene to quell speculative bubbles, on
the theory that the market is always correct. This was made even
worse by the Fed’s cultivation of a belief that no matter what goes
wrong, it will never allow a “too big to fail” institution to suffer
from excessively risky practices. If anything, this encouraged
more risk taking.
In recent years, the Fed chose to ignore the growth of sys-
temic risk, focusing instead on managing inflation expectations.
Unfortunately, it also put much more weight on inflation out-
comes, downplaying its mandate to pursue full employment.
This was justified—erroneously, we believe—on the argument
that low inflation and low inflation expectations somehow auto-
matically lead to robust economic growth and high employment.
In sum, the Fed’s growing focus on inflation fighting seems to
have diverted its attention away from its responsibility to regu-
late and supervise the financial sector, and its mandate to keep
unemployment low. This shift in priorities contributed to the
conditions that led to this crisis.
It is likely that this shift in priorities to managing inflation
expectations also prevented Fed researchers from recognizing the
growth of speculative and risky practices. With inflation over the
past two decades remaining at moderate levels, the Fed believed
its policies were working well. Each time there was a crisis, the
agency intervened to minimize disruptions. Markets coined a
term—the Greenspan “put”—and elevated the Fed chairman to
“maestro” status. While many economists outside the Fed did
“see it coming,” and while they continually questioned the wis-
dom of allowing serial speculative bubbles in equity, real estate,
and commodity markets, Fed researchers and policymakers
largely dismissed these warnings. Markets also frequently recog-
nized the risks, but presumed that the Fed would bail them out
in case of crisis. When policymakers view their role as one of
ignoring systemic risk while promising rescue, they are effectively
serving as cheerleaders for bubbles, manias, and crashes. This is
a dangerous mix, one bound to result in catastrophe.
In conclusion, the current crisis demonstrates the wisdom of
returning the Fed to its original mission, as amended over the
years by Congress:
• to act as lender of last resort, providing an elastic supply of
currency to banks as necessary to quell a liquidity crisis;
• to regulate and closely supervise financial institutions, to
ensure safety and soundness of the financial system; thisLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
includes the use of margin requirements and other means to
prevent financial institutions from fueling speculative bub-
bles, and resolving insolvent institutions rather than adopt-
ing a policy of “too big to fail” that promotes and rewards
reckless behavior; and
• to pursue the dual mandate of full employment and rea-
sonable price stability.
Quantitative Easing: Implementation and Impacts
Chairman Bernanke has long held that a central bank can con-
tinue to provide economic stimulus even after it has pushed
short-term interest rates near the zero lower bound. This was his
recommendation for Japan, which has held rates at or near zero
for a dozen years but remained mired in a downturn, with defla-
tion  of  asset  and  consumer  prices.  Before  joining  the  Fed,
Professor Bernanke promoted “quantitative easing,” a policy of
asset purchases by the central bank to create excess reserves in
the banking system. Since excess reserves earn little or no inter-
est, banks would be induced to make loans to earn more inter-
est. This, he argued, would encourage spending to create the
stimulus required for growth and job creation. 
After pushing the federal funds rate target close to zero (0–
25 basis points in December 2008), the Fed began to pursue its
first phase of quantitative easing (QE1), a new monetary policy
distinct from the “credit easing” that characterized the period
immediately following the onset of the crisis. In March 2009, the
Fed announced plans to increase its total purchases to $1.75 tril-
lion. These purchases—housing agency securities as well as
longer-term  US  Treasuries—generally  replaced  the  assets
acquired from standing facilities implemented during credit eas-
ing, as most of the credits were wound down and sustained the
more than doubling of the Fed’s balance sheet that occurred
under credit easing (Figures 1 and 2). By March 2010, it had
bought more than a fifth of the outstanding stock of longer-term
agency debt, fixed-rate mortgage-backed agency securities, and
Treasury  securities.  Purchases  were  handled  by  the  Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, which hired external investment
managers (BlackRock, Goldman Sachs, PIMCO, Wellington, and
JPMorgan Chase were hired to provide various services). 
Unlike typical open market operations, which are conducted
to accommodate banks’ desired reserve balances at the Fed’s 
target rate while minimizing impacts on the prices and yields of
the assets purchased, QE1 was designed to lower yields on longer-
term assets. The goal was similar to that of “Operation Twist”
from the early 1960s: lower the long-term interest rate relative to
the short-term rate (which was already near zero when QE1
began). According to a detailed staff study by the New York Fed,
the Federal Reserve’s $1.75 trillion in purchases lowered the term
premium by as much as 52 basis points (that is, half a percentage
point; using alternative methodologies, the estimated reduction
falls within a range of 38–82 basis points) (Gagnon et al. 2010).
Chairman Bernanke has recently announced that a new
round of quantitative easing (QE2) will entail purchasing an
additional $600 billion in Treasuries. Extrapolating from the New
York Fed’s study, this could be expected to lower long-term yields
by another 18 basis points. However, impacts on interest rates
on private debt resulting from QE2 will probably be less because,
unlike QE1, the Fed plans to buy government debt rather than
mortgage-related debt. Hence, we expect longer-term rates on
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private borrowing (such as fixed-rate mortgages) to fall by less
than 18 basis points.
Those who believe that QE works by filling banks with more
reserves than they want to hold, thus encouraging them to lend
out the excess, are clearly mistaken. First, banks do not and can-
not lend reserves to firms or households. Reserves are equivalent
to a bank’s checking account at the Fed, and it can only lend to
other institutions that also hold reserves at the Fed. Banks do
lend reserves to one another in the Fed funds market, but since
there is already more than $1 trillion dollars in excess reserves in
the system, there is no need to give them more in order to
encourage them to lend to one another. 
The other fallacious argument is that banks need excess
reserves to induce them to make loans to firms and households.
There are three relevant counterarguments. First, in normal
times banks make loans and then obtain the reserves that are
required for clearing or to be held against deposits. They first go
to the Fed funds market to borrow reserves; if there are no excess
reserves in the system as a whole, the Fed funds rate is bid up.
Because the Fed operates with a rate target, it will intervene to
supply the banks with reserves when the actual rate exceeds the
Fed’s tolerance for deviation from its target. Second, given that
banks already have $1 trillion in excess reserves, adding more
reserves will not increase their inducement to make loans—if
they want to make loans, they have enough in excess reserves to
cover literally trillions of dollars in new loans and deposits.
Finally—and this is a point to which we return below—the US
private sector is already suffering from excessive debt (indeed,
that was one of the factors that contributed to the crisis). It
makes little sense to encourage more lending and borrowing in
a condition of national overindebtedness.
Still others believe that the “cash” created by QE2 will create
more spending. That is, as the Fed purchases Treasuries from
households or firms, these entities will now have a deposit on
the asset side of their balance sheet where the Treasuries once
were. Of course, any individual holding a Treasury security who
wanted a deposit instead could sell the security at any time, with
or without QE2. The only difference is that with QE2, it may be
sold at a higher price. And, as with bank reserves, deposits do not
increase a bank’s ability to create loans; a bank makes a loan by
creating a demand deposit. In fact, Treasuries themselves are the
best form of collateral and are routinely leveraged several times
over in repurchase markets, in the process providing their own-
ers some of the lowest-cost financing available. 
Thus, whether one wants to focus on bank reserves or on
the deposits created by QE2, QE2 does not confer an “ability” to
create loans or spend that did not exist before. In both cases, the
effect of QE2 is to replace a longer-dated Treasury with shorter-
term investments in private portfolios, which on balance reduces
income received by the private sector (as we explain below). An
increase in spending would depend on whether the private sec-
tor wished to borrow more or to reduce saving out of current
income (things they can do anyway with or without QE2). Again,
it makes little sense to encourage households and firms to
increase debt or reduce saving within the current context of
record private sector debt.
If QE is to work, it is not through quantity but rather





















Figure 2 Federal Reserve Bank (Select) Assets,
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Fed funds rate down. But since the Fed now pays 25 basis points
on reserves, it is not possible to push the average rate below 25
basis points (since a profit-seeking bank will not lend reserves at
a rate lower than what the Fed pays). However, by purchasing
longer-term assets, the Fed can drive that rate down toward the
25-basis-point minimum. Competitive pressures can then lower
other rates—such as the rate banks charge on commercial and
mortgage loans. This is how QE could stimulate the economy.
But, as demonstrated by the New York Fed’s study, the impact of
QE2 on interest rates will not be large; even interest rates on US
Treasuries will fall only marginally. And if we presume that
reducing the rate on long-term Treasuries by 18 basis points
(based on the New York Fed’s estimate) were to carry through to
private lending rates, then the impact on private spending would
be trivial. To be sure, there is a great deal of controversy about the
interest rate elasticity of spending (i.e., how responsive spend-
ing is to changes of the interest rate). But even taking the high-
est estimates and most optimistic scenario into account, the
stimulative effect of QE2 on the types of spending thought to be
responsive to long-term interest rates would be insignificant. 
Indeed, since the announcement of QE2, Treasury rates have
actually risen slightly. This again demonstrates the importance of
understanding that the Fed’s operations are about price, not
quantity. If the Fed wanted Treasury rates to decline, it could only
be sure of achieving this goal by announcing the desired rate and
standing ready to buy all Treasuries offered at the corresponding
price. While this might require the Fed to buy more than the
announced $600 billion in QE2 funds (or it might not, in fact),
it would demonstrate that the Fed clearly understood its own
operations. Announcing a quantity target ($600 billion) is not
an effective way to lower yields, since the Fed will pay a market-
determined price to achieve that goal, and there is no guarantee
that market forces will lead to any reduction in yields with that
particular quantity of Treasuries purchased by the Fed. 
If the Fed instead announced a price target (corresponding,
say, to a yield of 2 percent on 10-year bonds), the market would
quickly move yields toward that target, for the simple reason that
it knows the Fed is able to purchase enough Treasuries to achieve
the target. The Fed’s operation of QE2 is similar to its earlier
operation of “credit easing” during the liquidity crisis: it focused
on the quantity of reserves to be supplied (e.g., through auctions)
rather than on the price (setting a Fed funds target and then
lending at that rate without limit, as a lender of last resort to all
financial  institutions).  Unfortunately,  the  Fed  still  has  not
learned how to efficiently implement monetary policy in order
to achieve the desired result of lowering interest rates. Indeed,
even the name of the policy, quantitative easing, indicates that
the Fed does not fully understand what it is trying to accomplish. 
Finally, if we consider the possible negative impact on
income and spending resulting from lower interest income on
savings, a plausible case can be made that QE2 will actually be
deflationary if it succeeds in lowering rates. Since QE2 targets
Treasuries, its greatest impact will be on Treasury yields, which
provide interest income to the nongovernment sector (house-
holds, firms, not-for-profits, pension funds, and so on). Yields
are already unusually low, having fallen on average by nearly five
percentage points at the short end of the yield curve and almost
two percentage points at the longer end of the yield curve since
the financial crisis began in August 2007. This has resulted in less
consumption by those who rely on government interest pay-
ments, such as retirees. Lower interest rates in turn encourage
savers to reduce consumption to the extent that they have savings
growth targets for retirement, college funds for their children,
and other financial goals. 
In sum, it is probable that QE2 will not provide much eco-
nomic stimulus; indeed, we cannot be sure that QE2 will be stim-
ulative at all, and there is even some possibility that it will reduce
income and spending.
QE and Its Critics
While some critics have likened QE to “helicopter drops of
money,” that clearly is not taking place. Particularly in the case of
QE2, the Fed’s actions merely replace Treasuries with reserves.
While that might have minimal impact on interest rates, it will
not induce much spending. Further, the current pressures on the
economy are overwhelmingly deflationary, and QE2 could even
add to deflationary impacts due to its effect on interest income. 
Recognizing this, some critics argue that today’s policy will
cause inflation in the future because QE will leave banks with
massive quantities of reserves. Yet the Fed can and will reverse
course if inflation pressures build. When the economy recovers,
and if there are signs of inflation, the Fed will begin to push up
short-term interest rates (as it has done for decades whenever
there were signs of inflation). It will also begin to drain excess
reserves from banks by unwinding its own portfolio. It will
accomplish this by selling its assets back into the banking sys-
tem: for each bond sale the Fed makes, it will debit bank reservesPublic Policy Brief, No. 117 8
dollar for dollar. If desired, it can do this at a measured pace, so
that these sales need not affect yields. Or it can proceed more
quickly, selling assets at a pace sufficient to push prices down
(and yields up). The process will continue until banks hold no
excess reserves.
From our discussion of interest rate elasticities, it is clear
that we doubt such actions have a decisive impact on aggregate
spending; we wish only to emphasize that the existence of more
than $1 trillion in excess reserves in the banking system will pose
no challenge to policymakers when they decide to reverse QE
and raise interest rates to fight perceived inflation pressures. It
should also be clear that we are not supporters of QE; rather, we
believe that the inflation argument is entirely erroneous. Anyone
making that argument simply does not understand monetary
operations. Finally, given that the quantity of reserves banks hold
has no impact on their ability to create loans or to otherwise
finance economic activity, there is in fact little economic neces-
sity for the Fed to drain excess reserves even if inflation pressures
do build. The Fed is perfectly able to raise the Fed funds rate tar-
get even in the presence of massive excess reserves, given that the
target rate is now set equal to the rate paid on excess reserves held
by banks. All the Fed needs to do is to bring the rate it pays in line
with the increase in its target rate, forcing up market rates on
overnight funds.
There have also been negative reactions, especially from
abroad, by those who fear that QE will cause the dollar to depre-
ciate. Following our discussion above, there is little justification
for such fear. QE will have minimal effects on long-term interest
rates and domestic spending. Hence, there is little reason to
believe that it will have direct impacts on capital flows or cur-
rent account deficits. 
To be sure, exchange rates are complexly determined and no
economic model has proven successful at forecasting their move-
ments. If QE has any impact on the value of the dollar, it is likely
to come through its effect on expectations. Ultimately, expecta-
tions must be grounded in something, and if QE has as little
impact on the US economy as we believe to be the case, then
there are no grounds for believing exchange rates will shift. But
announcements by US policymakers can have at least temporary
impacts. 
We do wish that the Fed and Treasury would issue an
announcement that US policymakers do not intend to depreci-
ate  the  dollar. We  believe  that  all  of  the  pressure  Treasury
Secretary Geithner is putting on some of our trading partners to
appreciate their currencies is a mistake, since it is tantamount to
arguing that the US government wants the dollar to depreciate.
The rest of the world views this as our intention to export our
way out of crisis—that is, by adopting a modern mercantilist pol-
icy. Such a strategy is not in the interest of the United States (it
would raise the cost of imports), nor would it be successful (it
would almost certainly lead to retaliatory measures). Many his-
torians believe that the Great Depression was worsened by
exactly such a strategy. US policymakers must instead look to
domestic policy measures to end this crisis.
Relative Potency of Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Over the past several decades, many economists and policymak-
ers have adopted the erroneous view that monetary policy,
almost alone, can be relied upon to stabilize the economy.
Further, it was believed that monetary policy means macro pol-
icy—control of the money supply, interest rates, or inflation—
thus leaving the financial sector to self-regulation by some sort
of “invisible hand” of self-interest. Current events demonstrate
both of these beliefs to be dangerously incorrect. It was precisely
the absence of close regulation and supervision of financial mar-
kets that created the most devastating financial crisis since the
1930s (by no coincidence, the last time that policymakers relied
on “free markets” in the financial sector, with virtually no use of
fiscal policy to stabilize the economy). And it was the relative
neglect of an active role for fiscal policy over the past few decades
that generated macroeconomic imbalances—for example, record
levels of household indebtedness as borrowing substituted for
jobs and income growth.
There was a long-term evolution in macroeconomic thought
away from the sensible postwar position that “you can’t push on
a string” (the idea that in the presence of pessimistic expecta-
tions, lowering interest rates through monetary easing would not
encourage spending) and toward the view that the Fed could
control the macroeconomy simply by managing expectations.
Ironically, this transition occurred even as macro performance
suffered, with more frequent and severe crises that were often
caused by “bubble and bust” cycles in financial markets. 
It  is  also  important  to  recognize  that  monetary  policy
“works” only if it can alter the private sector’s preference for debt
over saving out of current income. That is, adjusting interest
rates up or down can only affect the economy if the private sec-
tor then decides to borrow less or more. Similarly, even if QE didLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
work as both its proponents and some critics insist, it would only
be through encouraging the private sector to spend more out of
its existing income—which, again, is a highly questionable strat-
egy in a deep recession where the private sector is (rationally)
trying to deleverage.
Consequently, a strong case can be made that, while mone-
tary policy is relatively impotent when it comes to stabilizing our
real, productive economy, it has played a big role in pumping up
asset prices that then collapse in a speculative bust. Meanwhile,
our monetary policymakers have chosen to leave the financial
sector largely unregulated and unsupervised. That is, they have
refused to exercise their authority in the one area over which they
do have substantial control: regulation and supervision of finan-
cial institutions. 
Instead,  monetary  policymakers  have  pursued  macro 
policy on the highly dubious claim that they can fine-tune the
economy—which is more than a little ironic, since their own
approach  is  strongly  grounded  in  a  critique  of  so-called
Keynesian “fine-tuning.” Yet every tool and target that they have
chosen has failed in that task, from the reserves and money tar-
gets of Chairman Volcker, to the interest rate target of Chairman
Greenspan,  to  the  expectations  management  of  Chairman
Bernanke. None of these initiatives have given us sustainable
growth, sustainable job creation, or sustainable, rising living
standards. 
Indeed, incomes stopped growing for most American work-
ers as we downgraded the role of fiscal policy in favor of mone-
tary policy: for more than a generation, there has been no
appreciable increase in median real wages. Even at business cycle
peaks,  tens  of  millions  of  potential  workers  have  been  left
behind—unemployed or involuntarily out of the labor force—
and in recessions their ranks have swelled by millions more
(Pigeon and Wray 1998). Our nation’s infrastructure has been
allowed to deteriorate as much of the rest of the world caught
up with our living standards, and in some respects surpassed
them. While the United States has technologically advanced sec-
tors, we have fallen behind in many areas that matter for work-
ing people—such as modern public transportation, access to
decent health care, and high-quality education for most. All of
these are areas that cannot be stimulated by even well-formu-
lated monetary policy. These are the responsibilities of fiscal pol-
icy, and they have been neglected on the unfounded belief that
monetary policy alone is enough.
In a deep recession and financial crisis, well-formulated fis-
cal policy is a necessity. Its first task must be to reverse job loss.
While policy should help the private sector, given depressed



















Figure 3  Sector Financial Balances, 1952Q1 to 2010Q3














































































Figure 4  Household and Nonfinancial Business Net Saving,



























































Sources: National Income and Product Accounts, Flow of Funds, and authors’
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entire burden. They will increase hiring only as economic con-
ditions improve—no matter how many tax breaks we give them,
they will not increase employment until sales increase. American
households are already overburdened with debt, so we cannot
wait for them to decide to increase their spending; they are
rationally cutting back, trying to strengthen their balance sheets
by saving. Since the end of 2006, the total swing of the domestic
private sector balance—from large deficits (spending more than
income) to a substantial surplus)—has been more than 10 per-
cent of GDP (Figures 3, 4, and 5). That is a “demand gap” of 10
percent of GDP that must be made up by either the government
sector or the external sector. If the United States were a small
exporting nation, it could conceivably rely on export growth to
create the demand necessary to generate recovery. Clearly, that is
not the case: the United States’ economy is much larger than that
of any other nation, and its role as provider of the international
reserve currency makes it unlikely that export-led growth will
bring recovery. That leaves fiscal policy as the only possible
engine of growth. 
There has been a lot of debate about the success of the $800
billion–plus stimulus packages, with some claiming that fiscal
stimulus failed to generate economic recovery. Yet all reasonable
analyses have found that it prevented the economy from falling
farther than it did. While some of the spending and tax cuts may
have been ill conceived, the major problems with the stimulus
packages were that they were too small, and only temporary.
Indeed, as the stimulus came to an end, evidence of economic
weakening began to appear. Nowhere is this more obvious than
in the finances of state and local governments, with budget cuts
and employee layoffs continuing. It is inconceivable that this will
not  negatively  affect  businesses  and  households  in  coming
months. As public employees lose their jobs, it will impact the
already depressed real estate markets in multiple ways. America
is in real danger of slipping back into recession. 
What was needed was a larger and more permanent fiscal
policy to deal not only with the recession but also with the areas
of our economy that have long been neglected. We realize that
our position is at odds with the current attempt to reduce the
budget deficit. We note, however, that our currently large deficit
is primarily due to collapsing tax revenues (Figure 6), and 
secondarily, to the growth of transfer spending (mostly unem-
ployment compensation)—both of which are a result of the eco-
nomic  downturn.  The  budget  outcome  of  the  federal
government is largely determined by economic performance:
deficits rise in a recession and the budget moves toward balance,
















Figure 5  Sector Financial Balances, 1952Q1 to 2010Q3































































































Figure 6  Federal Government Receipts and Expenditures,




















Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and authors’ calculationsLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
of the budget is a function of the automatic stabilizers rather
than discretionary policy. This is a desired feature of a national
government budget, not a design flaw. Reacting to the normal
expansion of deficits with policies that cut spending or increase
taxes would be a mistake. 
Most of those who are proposing that we tackle the budget
deficit realize this, and hence are focused on deficit cutting once
recovery is under way. Yet experience over the past several busi-
ness-cycle swings shows that, if anything, the budget is exces-
sively biased toward tightening in a robust expansion. In the last
two growth cycles (neither of which achieved full employment of
our nation’s resources), federal tax revenues grew at an unsus-
tainably high pace—15 percent per year and even more. This was
two or three times faster than GDP. This means that if we were
to achieve and maintain full employment, the budget deficit
would quickly disappear. And that was precisely the experience
during the latter half of the 1990s, when a budget surplus was
last achieved. We do not wish to be misinterpreted: we are not
advocating a balanced budget, much less a budget surplus, as a
desired outcome. We are merely arguing that there is no reason
to believe that the federal budget stance is too “loose”—that is,
biased to run deficits at full employment. We think the evidence
shows precisely the reverse. If the economy recovers, the deficit
will rapidly shrink.
As to the longer-term deficits that supposedly will be gener-
ated by excessively generous “entitlements” (Medicare and Social
Security), we think the debate has run seriously astray, courtesy
of Blackstone chief Pete Peterson’s hedge fund billions. But that
is a topic beyond the scope of this paper.
There are similarities between our financial crisis and eco-
nomic downturn and the Japanese experience over the past two
decades. Japan also had a tremendous real estate boom that sub-
sequently collapsed. Figures 8, 9, and 10 superimpose Japanese
data on inflation, interest rates, and budget deficits over the same
data for the United States. We have shifted the time period to
make the performance over the crises comparable. What we see
so far is that the United States has been tracking Japan’s per-
formance on all these variables to a remarkable degree. Japan,
too, mostly relied on monetary policy. Expansion of its budget
deficit was mostly due to poor economic performance. While it
did try some limited stimulus packages, it always ended fiscal
stimulus before the economic recovery was sustained (often by















Figure 7 Federal Government Balance and Recessions,
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Years Before
Housing Peak
Years After Housing Peak
Note: In the United States, the core consumer price index (CPI), which
excludes food and energy prices, rose 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending
October 31, 2010. That was the smallest 12-month gain since the government
began calculating the figure in the 1950s. The chart shows the 12-month
changes in core CPI for the United States and Japan, in the years before and
after housing prices peaked in each country.
Japan (peak was June 1991)
United States (peak was June 2006)
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications, via Haver AnalyticsPublic Policy Brief, No. 117 12
raising consumption taxes). The monetary policy ease never
stopped the deflationary cycle, and real estate prices continue on
their downward trend today. We do not insist that Japan’s 20-
year-long nightmare is coming to America, but these charts
should prompt policymakers to consider a more aggressive
response, and one that will not exclude a greater role for sus-
tained fiscal policy stimulus.
Democratic Accountability and Transparency 
of the Fed
There is an additional reason to reject undue reliance on mone-
tary policy to the exclusion of fiscal policy: those in charge of
monetary policy are not subject to the same degree of demo-
cratic  accountability.  Further,  while  the  Fed’s  actions  have
become  more  transparent  since  1994  (when  Representative
Gonzalez caught Chairman Greenspan in a subterfuge, leading
the agency to substantially reduce its secrecy in response to con-
gressional demands), most of its deliberation remains behind
closed doors. At best, it informs Congress of its decisions after
the fact. We still do not know exactly what Timothy Geithner did
as president of the New York Fed. He has never revealed the full
extent of the promises made to private financial institutions, and
we do not have a full accounting of all the purchases and deals
made. Fed officials are not elected, and by design they are not
subject to the will of the voters. While the Fed is a creature of
Congress, current law does not provide substantive control. In
this section we will explore, in particular, the issues raised by a
too heavy reliance on the Fed, rather than on the fiscal authori-
ties, to deal with financial and economic crises.
Since  2007,  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  has  mounted  an
unprecedented effort to stabilize the financial system and the
national economy. Faced with the worst crisis since the Great
Depression, the Fed found that traditional monetary policy—
lowering interest rates and standing by as lender of last resort to
the regulated banking system—was impotent in the face of col-
lapsing asset prices and frozen financial markets. The Fed cre-
ated an “alphabet soup” of new facilities to provide liquidity to
markets. It worked behind the scenes to bail out troubled insti-
tutions. It provided guarantees for private liabilities. It extended
loans to foreign institutions, including central banks. And as a
result, its on-balance-sheet liabilities grew to $2 trillion, while its
off-balance-sheet contingent promises amounted to many tril-
lions more. 
Congress and the public at large have grown increasingly
concerned by the size of these commitments and the shroud of
secrecy surrounding actions taken by the Fed. For the most part,
the Fed has refused requests for greater transparency. Ironically,
Japan (1990–2010)
United States (2005–2010)







































Figure 9  US Federal Funds Rate and Japan Overnight Call































































Figure 10 Deficits in Japan and the United States
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when the crisis first hit, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson sub-
mitted to Congress a vague request for rescue funds that was
rejected precisely because it lacked both specifics and a mecha-
nism to give Congress oversight on the spending. Eventually, a
detailed stimulus package that totaled nearly $800 billion was
approved. Yet the Fed has spent, lent, or promised untold tril-
lions of dollars—far more dollars than Congress provided to the
Treasury. Most of this has been negotiated behind closed doors,
often at the New York Fed. The Fed’s defense is that such secrecy
is needed to prevent a run on troubled institutions, which would
only increase the government’s costs of resolution. There is, of
course, a legitimate reason to fear sparking a panic.
Yet, when relative calm returned to financial markets, the
Fed still resisted requests to explain its actions even ex post. This
finally led Congress, in a nearly unanimous vote, to call for an
audit of the Fed’s books. Members of both houses are now ques-
tioning the legitimacy of the agency’s independence. In particu-
lar, there are concerns that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
is too close to the Wall Street banks that it is supposed to over-
see, and that it has in many cases been forced to rescue. The head
of the New York Fed met frequently with the top management of
Wall Street institutions throughout the crisis, and reportedly
pushed deals that favored one institution over another. Like the
other district bank presidents, the president of the New York Fed
is  an  appointee—one  chosen  by  representatives  of  Federal
Reserve member banks. This has led critics to call for a rule
change allowing such appointments to be by the President of the
United States. And while the Fed has become much more open
since the early 1990s, the crisis has highlighted how little over-
sight the legislative and executive branches have over its opera-
tions, and how little transparency there is even today.
There is an inherent conflict between the need for trans-
parency and oversight when public spending is involved, and the
need for independence and secrecy in formulating monetary pol-
icy and in supervising regulated financial institutions. A demo-
cratic government cannot formulate its budget in secrecy. Except
when it comes to national defense, budgetary policy must be
openly debated and all spending subject to open audits. That is
exactly what was done in the case of the fiscal stimulus package. 
However, it is argued that monetary policy cannot be for-
mulated in the open—for example, a long and drawn-out open
debate by the Federal Open Market Committee about when and
by how much interest rates ought to be raised would generate
chaos in financial markets. Similarly, an open discussion by 
regulators about which financial institutions might be insolvent
would guarantee a run out of their liabilities and force a govern-
ment take-over. Even if these arguments are overstated, and even
if a bit more transparency could be allowed in such deliberations
by the Fed, it is clear that the normal operations of a central bank
will involve more closed-door discussion than is expected of the
federal budgetary process. Further, even if the governance of the
Fed were to be substantially reformed to allow for presidential
appointments of all top officials, the need for closed delibera-
tions would not be reduced.
The question is whether the Fed should be able to reach into
the public purse in times of national crisis. Was it appropriate
for the Fed to commit Uncle Sam to trillions of dollars of funds
to bail out US financial institutions, as well as foreign institu-
tions and governments (through repo operations with foreign
central banks that lent dollars to them, exposing the Fed to
default risk)? When Chairman Bernanke was grilled in Congress
about whether it was “taxpayer money” that he had committed,
he responded no—it was simply a series of balance-sheet entries.
While there is an element of truth in his response, it is also highly
misleading. There is no difference between a Treasury guarantee
of a private liability and a Fed guarantee. If the Fed buys an asset
(say, a mortgage-backed security) by “crediting a balance sheet,”
it is no different from the Treasury buying an asset by “crediting
a balance sheet.” The impact on Uncle Sam’s balance sheet is the
same in either case: it is the creation, in dollars, of government
liabilities, and it leaves the government holding some asset that
could carry default risk. 
The Fed does keep a separate balance sheet and normally
runs a profit (its assets earn more than it pays on its liabilities).
Profits on Fed equity above 6 percent are turned over to the
Treasury. If as a result of its bailout activities the Fed’s prof-
itability is diminished, the Treasury’s revenues will suffer. If the
Fed were to accumulate massive losses, the Treasury would have
to bail it out, with Congress budgeting for the losses. We are not
projecting that this will be the case but merely pointing out that,
in practice, the Fed’s promises are ultimately Uncle Sam’s prom-
ises, and they are made without the approval of Congress—and
in some cases, even without its knowing about them months
after the fact. Nor are we implying that Uncle Sam would be
unable to keep such promises. There is no default risk on federal
government debt, and the government can afford to meet any
and all commitments it makes. Rather, we are simply emphasiz-
ing that a Fed promise is ultimately a Treasury promise that Public Policy Brief, No. 117 14
carries the full faith and credit of the United States. Our question
is one of accountability: should the Fed be able to make these
commitments  behind  closed  doors,  without  the  consent  of
Congress?
Some will object that there is a fundamental difference
between spending by the Fed and spending by the Treasury. The
Fed’s actions are limited to purchasing financial assets, lending
against collateral, and guaranteeing private liabilities. While the
Treasury also operates some lending programs and guarantees
private liabilities (e.g., through the FDIC and Sallie Mae pro-
grams), and while it has purchased private equities in recent
bailouts (of GM, for example), most of its spending takes the
form of transfer payments and purchases of real output. Yet,
when the Treasury engages in lending or guarantees, its funds
must be approved by Congress. The Fed faces no such budgetary
constraint. 
Further, when the Treasury provides a transfer payment to
a Social Security recipient, a credit to the recipient’s bank account
is created (and the bank’s reserves are credited for the same
amount). If the Fed were to buy a private financial asset from
that same retiree (say, a security), the retiree’s bank account (and
the bank’s reserves) would be credited in exactly the same man-
ner. In the first case, Congress had approved the payment to the
Social Security beneficiary; in the second case, no congressional
approval was obtained. While these two operations are likely to
lead to very different outcomes (the Social Security recipient’s
income has risen and he/she is likely to spend the receipt; the sale
of a security simply increases the seller’s liquidity rather than
his/her income, and may not induce spending by the seller), so
far as committing Uncle Sam they are equivalent, since each leads
to the creation of a bank deposit as well as bank reserves that are
a government liability.
There is a difference in the impact on the federal govern-
ment’s reported budget, however: spending by the Treasury that
is not offset by tax revenue will lead to a reported budget deficit
and (normally) to an increase in the outstanding government
debt stock. By contrast, purchases or loans by the Fed lead to an
increase in outstanding bank reserves (an IOU of the Fed) that
is not counted as part of deficit spending or as government debt
(assuming there is ultimately no default on assets purchased by
the Fed). (The details of all this are complicated, and there can be
knock-on effects that complicate matters further.) While this
could be seen as an advantage because it effectively keeps a
bailout “off the books,” it comes at the cost of reduced account-
ability and less democratic deliberation. This is unfortunate,
since operationally there is no difference between a bailout that
is taken “on the books” by the Treasury (thus following normal
budgeting procedure) and one that is undertaken off the books
by the Fed (and thus largely unaccountable).
Bailouts necessarily result in winners and losers, and the
socialization of losses. At the end of the 1980s, when it became
necessary to resolve the thrift industry, Congress created an
authority (the Resolution Trust Corporation) and budgeted
funds for the resolution. It was recognized that losses would be
socialized, with a final accounting in the neighborhood of $200
billion. Government officials involved in the resolution were held
accountable for their actions, and more than one thousand thrift
officers went to prison. While undoubtedly imperfect, the reso-
lution was properly funded, implemented, and managed through
to completion. 
By contrast, the bailouts in this much more serious crisis
have so far been uncoordinated, mostly off budget, and done
largely in secret—and mostly by the Fed. There were exceptions,
of course. There was a spirited public debate about whether the
government ought to rescue the auto industry. In the end, funds
were budgeted and the government took an equity share and an
active role in the decision making, openly picking winners and
losers. Again, the rescue was imperfect, but today, it seems to have
been successful. Whether it will still look successful a decade
from  now  we  cannot  know,  but  at  least  we  do  know  that
Congress decided the industry was worth saving as a matter of
public policy. 
No such public debate occurred in the case of, say, Goldman
Sachs—which was apparently saved by a series of indirect meas-
ures by the Fed (which, for example, provided funds to AIG that
were immediately and secretly passed through to Goldman).
There was never any public discussion of the need to rescue
Goldman through the back-door means of funding AIG; indeed,
those actions were discovered only after the fact. The main pub-
lic justification for rescuing financial institutions has been the
supposed need to “get credit flowing again,” but if so, the bailouts
have been largely unsuccessful (given debt loads in the private
sector, encouraging lending is probably unwise in any case).
Alternative methods of stimulating credit, or—better—of stim-
ulating private spending, have hardly been discussed. 
Indeed, the massive sums already provided to Wall Street
(again, mostly off budget) prove to be a tremendous barrier to
formulating another stimulus package for Main Street. Even asLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 15
labor markets remain moribund, homeowners continue to face
foreclosures, and retailers face bankruptcy, Congress fears voter
backlash regarding additional government commitments. While
economists make a fine distinction between commitments made
by the Fed and those made by the Treasury, voters do not. Uncle
Sam is on the hook, no matter who put him there. The public
wants to know what good has been accomplished by expanding
the Fed’s balance sheet liabilities to $2 trillion dollars and, by
extension, Uncle Sam’s commitments by perhaps $20 trillion,
through loans, guarantees, and bailouts. 
We conclude with a number of important issues surround-
ing transparency and accountability that we intend to explore in
subsequent research:
• Is there an operational difference between commitments
made by the Fed and those made by the Treasury? What are
the linkages between the balance sheets of the Fed and the
Treasury?
• Are there conflicts arising between the Fed’s responsibility
for normal monetary policy operations and the need to oper-
ate a government safety net to deal with severe systemic crises?
• How much transparency and accountability should the
Fed’s operations be exposed to? Are different levels of trans-
parency and accountability appropriate for different kinds
of operations—for example, formulation of interest rate
policy, oversight and regulation, resolution of individual
institutions, and the rescue of an entire industry during a
financial crisis?
• Should safety net operations during a crisis be subject to
normal Congressional oversight and budgeting? Should
such operations be on or off budget? Should extensions of
government guarantees (whether by the Fed or the Treasury)
be subject to congressional approval?
• Is there any practical difference between Fed liabilities (ban-
knotes and reserves) and Treasury liabilities (coins and
bonds or bills)? If the Fed spends by “keystrokes” (crediting
balance sheets, as Chairman Bernanke says), can or does the
Treasury spend in the same manner? 
• Is there a limit to the Fed’s or the Treasury’s ability to spend,
lend, or guarantee? If so, what are those limits? And what are
the consequences of increasing Fed and Treasury liabilities?
• What can we learn from the successful resolution of the
1980s thrift crisis that could be applicable to the current cri-
sis? Going forward, is there a better way to handle the reso-
lution of financial crises, putting in place a template for a
government safety net to deal with systemic crises when they
occur? (This is a separate question from the creation of a
systemic regulator to attempt to prevent crises from occur-
ring; however, Congress should explore the wisdom of sep-
arating the safety net’s operation from the operations of a
systemic regulator.)
• What should be the main focuses of the government’s safety
net? Possibilities include: rescuing and preserving insolvent
financial institutions versus resolving them, encouraging
private lending versus direct spending by government to cre-
ate aggregate demand and jobs, debt relief versus protection
of interests of financial institutions, and minimizing budg-
etary costs to government versus minimizing private or
social costs. 
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